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Abstract
This paper offers a state-of-the-art overview of the intertwined privacy, confidentiality, and security
issues that are commonly encountered in health research involving disaggregate geographic data
about individuals. Key definitions are provided, along with some examples of actual and potential
security and confidentiality breaches and related incidents that captured mainstream media and
public interest in recent months and years. The paper then goes on to present a brief survey of the
research literature on location privacy/confidentiality concerns and on privacy-preserving solutions
in conventional health research and beyond, touching on the emerging privacy issues associated
with online consumer geoinformatics and location-based services. The 'missing ring' (in many
treatments of the topic) of data security is also discussed. Personal information and privacy
legislations in two countries, Canada and the UK, are covered, as well as some examples of recent
research projects and events about the subject. Select highlights from a June 2009 URISA (Urban
and Regional Information Systems Association) workshop entitled 'Protecting Privacy and
Confidentiality of Geographic Data in Health Research' are then presented. The paper concludes
by briefly charting the complexity of the domain and the many challenges associated with it, and
proposing a novel, 'one stop shop' case-based reasoning framework to streamline the provision of
clear and individualised guidance for the design and approval of new research projects (involving
geographical identifiers about individuals), including crisp recommendations on which specific
privacy-preserving solutions and approaches would be suitable in each case.
Introduction
Definitions–the security-confidentiality-privacy triad
In micro-scale geographical analyses involving data about
specific individuals, data security, confidentiality and pri-
vacy form an intertwined triad. A recent US CDC (Centers
for Disease Control and Prevention) foundation course
on public health law [1] defines privacy as the "individ-
ual's right to control the acquisition, use and disclosure of
their identifiable health information". The same course
goes on to define confidentiality as the "privacy interests
that arise from specific relationships (e.g., doctor/patient,
researcher/subject) and corresponding legal and ethical
duties", and then describes security as the "technological
or administrative safeguards or tools to protect identifia-
ble health information from unwarranted access, use, or
disclosure". To explain the relationships between the
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three terms, the course quotes a key sentence from Ware
[2]: "If the security safeguards in an automated system fail
or are compromised, a breach of confidentiality can occur
and the privacy of data subjects invaded".
Mainstream media and public interest in the subject
Actual or potential breaches (technological or legal) of
data security and confidentiality and the subsequent
actual or potential invasions of individuals' privacy are
quite commonly reported in mainstream media. For
example, in March 2009, the Joseph Rowntree Reform
Trust published its 'Database State' report on the legality,
safety and effectiveness of the British government's major
database systems [3,4]. Of 46 databases assessed in this
report, only six were found to have a proper legal basis for
any privacy intrusions and were deemed proportionate
and necessary in a democratic society. The report authors
concluded that two NHS (National Health Service) sys-
tems, the Detailed Care Record (DCR) and the Secondary
Uses Service (SUS) [5], were almost certainly illegal and
that a number of others including the Summary Care
Record (SCR) would be legal only with patient consent,
but, with the current absence of an effective opt-out, it too
was almost certainly illegal.
We also read the story of an anonymous Canadian girl
whose death was associated with a prescribed acne drug.
She was eventually identified by the media who compared
the de-identified prescription data set against obituaries.
The comparison helped in narrowing down the search to
four possible girls, then by contacting all families the right
one was found [6].
High-profile security breaches (e.g., data loss or theft of
ill-protected confidential data) are also not uncommon.
For example, it was reported in May 2009 that a laptop
containing non-encrypted data (names, addresses, dates
of birth, employers, national insurance numbers, salary
information, and bank details) of 109,000 UK pensioners
has been stolen [7]. The data were merely password-pro-
tected, and possibly without any appropriate safeguards
for data self-destruction in case of brute-force password
attacks. It is very easy to find out passwords in a short time
using common hardware, e.g., NVIDIA CUDA GPUs
(Compute Unified Device Architecture Graphics Process-
ing Units), and readily available software [8], or even to
completely bypass the passwords and directly access the
underlying non-encrypted data.
In public health worldwide, any public identification of
an individual's health status and address, regardless of
contagion level or risk, is usually prohibited. But individ-
ual privacy rights must also be balanced with legitimate
public concerns and interests. The publicly-accessible,
online mapping of SARS (Severe Acute Respiratory Syn-
drome) in Hong Kong a few years ago using disaggregate
case data at individual infected building level in near real
time was one of the noticeable exceptions to the well-
established public health confidentiality rule [9,10].
Research literature: location privacy concerns 
and solutions
The biomedical and public health literature on geographic
information systems (GIS) and spatio-temporal analyses
features a large number of research papers mentioning or
addressing location privacy, e.g., [11-28]. A must-read
paper (not specifically health-related) dating back to 1994
[29] shows how chronic privacy issues are in GIS research.
Some research papers identified privacy as a potential or
actual issue of concern (e.g., in reproductive health
research [18]; in birth defects surveillance and research
[19]; in research relevant to policy on diet, physical activ-
ity, and weight [20]; in environmental health research
[21]; and in health and social care planning [22]), while
others went one step further by suggesting some compre-
hensive solutions (e.g., [23-26]), workarounds, or frame-
works and principles of practice (e.g., [29]) to mitigate or
resolve these privacy concerns.
A number of confidentiality-preserving statistical and epi-
demiological data processing methods (data aggregation
and transformations) have been proposed that can be
applied to original location data to preserve individuals'
privacy while maintaining some acceptable level of data
usefulness for geographical analyses. But the use of precise
addresses will continue to be needed in many cases to
improve data analysis results or make them possible at all.
The famous John Snow's map of the 1854 Cholera out-
break in London only solved the problem because the
unique locations of individual cases were known [15,30].
There will always be this implicit trade-off between pri-
vacy concerns (e.g., easiness of re-identification) and the
types and accuracy of the results of geographical health
analyses that are possible with a given data set (original,
unaltered vs. transformed or aggregated data) [25,27,28].
And that is where software agents can offer a potential
solution that preserves the full fidelity of the original data
[25].
Moving beyond conventional GIS research and geograph-
ical analyses, mobile phones and other electronic gadgets
are rapidly gaining location awareness and wireless Web
connectivity, thus promising new spatial technology
applications and services (e.g., [31-33]), which will yield
vast amounts of spatial information and online maps that
can even reveal users' whereabouts in real time. These
novel spatial tools and services are certainly opening
many new useful possibilities, but are not without their
challenging security and privacy concerns [34,35].International Journal of Health Geographics 2009, 8:46 http://www.ij-healthgeographics.com/content/8/1/46
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The 'missing ring': data security
Data security is relatively under-mentioned in discussions
about confidentiality-preserving solutions for location
data, despite its key importance in the aforementioned
security-confidentiality-privacy triad. Consider the fol-
lowing scenario: a health GIS researcher has legitimate
and IRB (institutional review board)-approved access to
patient data containing precise geographical identifiers
for analysis and reporting purposes, with full patient con-
sent. The reporting is done in ways that do not identify
individual patients when posting publicly-accessible/
online results and maps. If the reporting must be made at
some level of detail or granularity that can potentially
identify individual patients, the results are only shared
within approved, small teams of users with legitimate
access rights and 'need to know'. The whole scenario
seems fine as far as the protection of individuals' privacy
is concerned. IRB approval has been sought, adequate
reporting methods and policies are in place to prevent the
disclosure of any confidential data to non-authorised par-
ties, and we even have the patients' explicit consent to
conduct the study. However, without appropriate addi-
tional security safeguards, there will always be many
unmitigated risks of data theft or loss and of unwanted
data disclosure to non-authorised or non-authenticated
parties, all of which can compromise the privacy of the
data subjects. (Ideally, IRBs should be scrutinising the
security component as well before granting approvals.)
A carefully blended, purpose-built combination of over-
lapping security measures is always the solution, depend-
ing on the type, sensitivity, value, and risks/costs
assessment of the data to be protected. Various types of
advanced cryptography, multimodal biometrics, and
other methods can be combined, as necessary. Data access
can also be controlled or restricted in such a way that two
or more persons must be physically present each time and
authenticated (e.g., via biometrics) to unlock the data.
Security measures cover and include, among other things,
ensuring physical building security, using computer secu-
rity cable locks, using computers with a built-in TPM
(Trusted Platform Module) chip for cryptographic func-
tions, performing full disk encryption with TPM (e.g.,
using BitLocker [36]), implementing brute-force pass-
word attack protection (data are automatically erased after
a pre-set number of failed access attempts), using hard-
ware/software firewalls and other forms of network secu-
rity, implementing adequate access policies and
authentication [37] (at computer BIOS–Basic Input/Out-
put System level, Operating System-level, and application
level), considering Multilevel Security (MLS), using bio-
metrics (e.g., fingerprint readers and facial recognition),
using advanced secure USB flash drives with military
grade hardware encryption (e.g., [38,39]) instead of ordi-
nary flash drives, keeping detailed data inventories and
electronic audit trails of all accesses and transactions,
blanking of computer display and machine locking or
auto-log-off if a machine is left unattended, and the secure
decommissioning and discarding of old equipment and
data storage media, e.g., using software utilities like SDe-
lete [40] to prevent the kind of issues described in [41].
Also equally important are staff training and the develop-
ment of a 'security culture' in the organisation, e.g., guided
by ISO/IEC 27002 2005 (formerly ISO/IEC 17799 2005),
an ISO (International Organization for Standardization)
standard for information security and a code of practice
for information security management.
Personal information and privacy legislations
A discussion on location privacy solutions for health
research would be incomplete without reflecting on some
of the underlying reasons that necessitate their develop-
ment. The very notion of privacy is itself a complex fabric
of interwoven philosophical and psychosocial threads.
Perhaps this is why the associated bureaucratic and legal
landscape is as complex as it is – and often blamed for the
issue. A large majority of public health professionals con-
sider privacy to be an obstacle to public health; when
asked for the underlying reasons, survey respondents in
Canada and the UK most commonly identified bureauc-
racy and legislation [42].
There is no universal legislation to guide and govern the
activities of public health professionals, particularly
where issues of privacy are concerned. Instead, nations
have their own constraining or enabling privacy and data
protection laws, with some being such a maze of cross-ref-
erenced "legalese" that familiarising oneself with them –
let alone gaining a thorough understanding of them –
becomes a daunting task. 'Additional file 1' provides a
brief compilation and comparison of relevant personal
information and privacy legislation in Canada and UK,
with particular focus on location and public health as seen
and understood by an epidemiologist.
Some recent research projects and events about 
the subject
The issues of location privacy were also the subject of
GeoPKDD (Geographic Privacy-Aware Knowledge Dis-
covery and Delivery [43]), a three-year EU-funded project
that was recently completed in November 2008. GeoP-
KDD's main research question was 'how to discover useful
knowledge about human movement behaviour from
mobility data (e.g., location data from mobile phones),
while preserving the privacy of the people under observa-
tion?' The project attempted to develop new privacy-pre-
serving methods for extracting knowledge from large
amounts of raw data about individuals referenced in space
and time. GeoPKDD organised the 'First Interdisciplinary
Workshop on Mobility, Data Mining and Privacy: Preserv-International Journal of Health Geographics 2009, 8:46 http://www.ij-healthgeographics.com/content/8/1/46
Page 4 of 8
(page number not for citation purposes)
ing anonymity in geographically referenced data' on 14
February 2008 in Rome, Italy [44].
Another research activity worth mentioning in our context
is the proposal by Helen Chen at Agfa HealthCare in Can-
ada and her colleagues at the World Wide Web Consor-
tium–W3C Semantic Web for Health Care and Life
Sciences Interest Group (HCLSIG) to explore Semantic
Web solutions for patient data security, confidentiality,
consent and privacy (in general, i.e., they are not focusing
on location privacy, but their proposal is still broadly rel-
evant to our topic). Previously sufficient de-identification
techniques can be rendered inadequate because it is now
possible to re-identify an identity via inference on the
Web. Semantic Web technology is making headway to
even more powerful data links, connections and infer-
ences of this type. However, in the healthcare domain,
this very success of the technology is putting individuals'
privacy at much greater risks. Chen's idea is to develop
novel privacy-preserving solutions by harnessing the very
same Semantic Web technology that can exacerbate these
privacy risks [45].
From 5–8 June 2009, the Urban and Regional Informa-
tion Systems Association (URISA [46]), a non-profit
American association of professionals using GIS and other
information technologies to solve challenges in state/pro-
vincial and local government agencies and departments,
organised its Second GIS in Public Health Conference in
Providence, Rhode Island, USA. One of the pre-confer-
ence workshops held on the 5th of June 2009 focused on
issues related to 'Protecting Privacy and Confidentiality of
Geographic Data in Health Research'. Select highlights
from this workshop are presented in the remaining part of
this article.
Select highlights from a recent URISA workshop 
on location privacy in health research
At the 2009 URISA GIS in Public Health Conference, a
workshop organised by Ellen Cromley and Andrew Curtis
focused on the issue of location privacy in health research.
Among the topics covered by panellists and attendees
were methods of spatial data protection, the need to "edu-
cate" IRBs, challenges facing data owners and custodians
wishing to visualise and disseminate data, how published
maps continue to violate confidentiality, some general
cartographic guidelines and "fixes", and new methods of
spatial data masking. In addition, the participants spent
considerable time discussing the ethical and legal chal-
lenges researchers now face as HIPAA (US Health Insur-
ance Portability and Accountability Act) regulations
change, placing more responsibility on the data user
(researcher). Although the majority of attendees to the
meeting were data owners or custodians, this article is
written mainly from the perspective of the data user, espe-
cially a social science/geographic information science
researcher. As researchers, our usual role is to spatially
analyse data, collect new spatial data with health implica-
tions, and visualise results in multiple forums, especially
academic journals.
In 2006 Curtis et al. published a paper in International
Journal of Health Geographics highlighting the potential for
point level data to be reengineered from published maps
through a process of digital scanning and georeferencing,
even with only limited geographical features [11]. By
heads-up digitising these points, coordinates could be
used to direct field teams to actual homes. This conceptual
approach had previously been impossible to replicate
with real data, but by using this case from Hurricane Kat-
rina, the map of mortality locations, and search and res-
cue markings that actually identified where bodies were
found, validation was possible. Concurrent to this article,
other reengineering approaches appeared using simulated
data and a more systematic approach to identifying
homes from a low resolution map [12]. Both papers
revealed that published maps, even of low resolution and
with limited geographical information, could still be reen-
gineered back to an exact address, or so close to the 'real
world' location that even without resorting to use other
quasi identifiers, the spatial confidentiality of those being
mapped was violated.
As researchers specialising in geographic information, we
need to be proactive in setting guidelines for the display
of confidential data, in policing our own actions, and in
educating those sitting in positions of data power, espe-
cially our IRBs. Critics of the presentation usually focus on
the data source–"this is a newspaper map so there is no
confidentiality violation". However, there have been at
least two maps appearing in journals that have also pub-
lished the same Katrina mortality point locations. But irre-
spective of this, the real message is, any point level map can
be reengineered back in the same way. As academics where
does our ethical path lie with these secondary sources
obtained from the media? We may not legally be violating
confidentiality, but does that give us the right to use non-
official sources, apply our geospatial skills and create sen-
sitive layers in other outlets?
Now in mid-2009, what has changed? Are maps still being
published in academic journals that violate spatial confi-
dentiality? And where are we on the issue of cartographic
guidelines? Unfortunately it is still too easy to find similar
map violations appearing after 2006. One can find exam-
ples of maps with point level mortality locations, preg-
nancies, at-risk pregnancy programme participants, and
people suffering from different respiratory ailments –
indeed we challenge the reader to see how many point
level health maps they can find. Of particular concern areInternational Journal of Health Geographics 2009, 8:46 http://www.ij-healthgeographics.com/content/8/1/46
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those sub-disciplines which have just discovered the value
of GIS–we cannot expect that confidentiality violation
through cartographic design is uppermost in the minds of
those effusing over the wonders of buffering.
What else has changed? Paradoxically, the attention cur-
rently being paid to geocoding accuracy – which is impor-
tant from a health research perspective, and which has
received considerable attention in International Journal of
Health Geographics – also has a detrimental side in terms
of making published source maps both more accurate and
precise. This means the chance of successful reengineering
in terms of being closer to the actual address has
increased. In effect, this previously unintentional form of
masking has been reduced. Secondly, smoothing
approaches, such as density surfaces, are being used to
preserve confidentiality in maps (and stated as such by the
authors). On one hand this is good news in terms of
researchers' understanding that there is a confidentiality
issue, but on the other hand this quick-fix is problematic
due to a reliance on techniques that do not achieve this
goal. The combination of window/kernel/filter size, the
underlying grid cell resolution, and especially if there is
no option for a minimum denominator, may result in
"bulls-eyes" for areas of the map with relatively few resi-
dential alternatives, otherwise known as the 'geographic
area population size' [47]. It should also be remembered
that less dense geographies are not necessarily rural; many
urban areas also contain physical features (inlets, lakes,
even hills) can remove alternative possible locations. By
referring to high resolution aerial photography (now
found easily in applications such as Google Earth [35]), it
is relatively easy to identify the cause of the intensity. On
this subject, geospatial Internet applications in general
have made the reengineering process even easier for those
with and without a working knowledge of GIS.
From a data users' perspective, we are still limited by data
being released at an aggregation that is limited for
research, the standard for HIPPA being a zip code with
20,000 individuals. A group of Canadian researchers
showed that this is an archaic approach and that mini-
mum denominators should vary when taking into
account the underlying geography and the number of
quasi identifiers [47]. Similar papers written for research-
ers in other countries, possibly even providing a series of
size guidelines for different urban areas, would be invalu-
able. It would also help the job of IRBs.
And on the subject of IRBs, from our experience there is
still a disconnection in terms of understanding exactly
where the risks lie in geospatial output and confidential-
ity. This is understandable given the confusion even
amongst geospatial researchers. What would benefit all
concerned would be a well-respected body in the field of
public health to commission a "guidelines" paper. This
could become the reference in terms that researchers, IRBs,
and even research subjects could understand and cite,
along with other existing key texts, such as [48]. These ref-
erence guidelines should include clear visual examples of
what is not acceptable, including the pitfalls of common
"fixes" such as smoothing. They could also provide guid-
ance for appropriate aggregation denominator sizes. This
is important as researchers seek IRB approval in the use of
mobile geospatial devices for collecting health and built
environment data. We cannot expect IRBs to understand
where such cartographic risks lie. Finally, language should
be included that would help IRBs and be required in any
letter gaining subject permission. In other words, "if we
ask for an address (or a street intersection... or a zip code...)
this is the only way we will display it on a map". This simple
approach would mean that IRB, researcher and subject
would all have the same understanding of what will hap-
pen with these data. (Ellen Cromley has vested considera-
ble time on spatially appropriate language for informed
consent as a guideline for IRBs. She disseminated exam-
ples of this language at the URISA workshop.)
This 'best practice guide' should be circulated to all jour-
nals who publish maps, clearly stating the risks involved
in accepting point level maps. At least this would
enlighten editors [49] and hopefully force them to ask
submitting authors about 'what steps have been taken to pre-
serve confidentiality?'
Until we have such a universally accepted document, self-
policing is the main option, and with this in mind, we
have a few issues a researcher should ponder before pub-
lishing any map. Most importantly, is a point-level (or
smoothed, or small aggregation) map necessary? As a
geographer this last statement certainly hurts, but unless a
map is really needed to help frame a paper's content, or
improve the understanding of the reader regarding a spa-
tial process, and especially if it is not even specifically
referred to in the text, then it is better to err on the side of
caution.
We fully realise that some point-level maps will still need
to be published; it is often easier to explain a spatial proc-
ess through a graphic, but if this is the case then is the
underlying geography needed? If we are overlaying points
against output from a spatial analysis, do we need politi-
cal boundaries or street networks? If geographical refer-
ences are necessary in the map, then data masking is
essential.
There is some good news though, as we have noticed more
researchers referencing steps taken to preserve confidenti-
ality during recent presentations.International Journal of Health Geographics 2009, 8:46 http://www.ij-healthgeographics.com/content/8/1/46
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Emerging issues
There are three emerging spatial confidentiality topics of
concern. The first involves Google Street View [50], an
excellent research tool that allows us to "see" areas that are
described or mapped in publications. The implication this
has for reengineering is the ability to see potential candi-
dates within an area. If we again think of the "bulls eye"
effect within a smoothed surface, if this area has been
driven by the Google Street View team (and thankfully at
this point areas of sparse geography also tend to be the
least covered), we could literally view each option within
the central pixel until a house match is found. Even with
multiple alternatives, it might be possible to spatially pri-
oritise the potential buildings based on characteristics of
the health conditions, or other information gleaned from
the paper. For example, is the disease more typically asso-
ciated with a multi-family unit than a single residence?
The second area of concern involves the use of biometric
sensors synched to a GPS (Global Positioning System)
unit. This field of research offers great potential in terms
of linking health outcomes to the fine-scale built environ-
ment. However, a fear expressed at the URISA workshop
was that output from these devices, usually shown as a
series of dots on an aerial photograph, will begin to
accompany research papers. Sure enough, within one day
of the workshop a new issue of a GIS journal published
this exact output. The underlying aerial photograph
makes reengineering from the image extremely easy, and
the point concentrations from the GPS unit correspond to
areas of highest activity, including the home. This is not a
good situation, especially when the participants are part
of a vulnerable population, such as children.
Finally, we are worried about the current trend by social
scientists of including spatial data in their research, espe-
cially those who use mixed methods. A mixed method
approach combines both qualitative and quantitative
data. For example, spatial video data of the recovering
neighbourhoods of New Orleans, LA, USA, are currently
being collected. These data are extracted from the video as
three-dimensional surfaces that can be mapped or ana-
lysed for recovery or abandonment. At the same time, vid-
eos of the narrative of the neighbourhood participants
add further commentary to the surfaces, such as why a
building has not been returned to. Many of these com-
ments contain sensitive information such as the health of
an owner. If we map this information, others could easily
disseminate it through online consumer geoinformatics
services like Google Earth and Google Map, and even link
it using suitable geo-mashups [51] to other readily availa-
ble online information about the individuals concerned
(e.g., on social networking sites), thus revealing a more
detailed picture about them. Do our subjects really know
all what could be exposed through such mapping? (But
one should also consider the difference between what is
technically possible and what is practically likely to happen,
i.e., will there really be someone with the motive, will and
ability to do these privacy threatening Web inferencing
and mapping exercises in each and every case? A risks-
costs-benefits assessment might help in such situations.)
Although these situations may not fall foul of any HIPAA
standard, nor probably concern an IRB, we are now at a
point where changing geospatial technologies must stim-
ulate debate that goes beyond the normal community par-
ticipatory ethical standards used by researchers [35].
Because of the widespread adoption of GIS-light Internet
applications, and cheap and easy-to-use mobile mapping
devices (for example, ones which can tag pictures with
coordinates), health related spatial confidentiality is now
no longer the concern of only geographic information sci-
entists, or even GIS users, but also of a far broader range
of academics and other people.
Conclusion
Although the general public's concerns about privacy in
research have sometimes been exaggerated by the scien-
tific community [52] (and by a few vocal privacy advo-
cates in the media, who do not adequately represent the
position of the wider masses), we believe there are still
many cases where these concerns are real and legitimate,
and where data subjects need to be protected (e.g., from
identity theft). A 'one-size-fits-all' privacy-preserving solu-
tion is unlikely to be successful or to be able to capture
and properly address the complex requirements, which
might also vary from country to country, of the very many
(i) user roles, with different access privileges and 'needs to
know' in relation to various input and output data types;
(ii) intra and extra-mural data sharing arrangements,
especially when data need to be moved across heterogene-
ous organisations; (iii) governing legislations and poli-
cies; (iv) possible forms of data inputs that can be released
for research and the associated conditions; (v) health
study types and goals, data analysis methods and the data
requirements in each case; (vi) possible study outputs/
results reporting and publication forms (closed or pub-
lic); (vii) situation-specific security risks; and (viii) risks-
costs-benefits assessment, among other aspects and
requirements that are involved in this area of research and
need to be considered on a case-by-case basis.
Different privacy-preserving solutions can be applied con-
currently or singly on various elements of this complex
chain, e.g., on input data prior to release to researchers
(e.g., aggregation or transformations) and/or on the
research outputs (e.g., access restriction or masking),
depending on the specific situation at hand; so a compre-
hensive, context-aware approach is needed to assistInternational Journal of Health Geographics 2009, 8:46 http://www.ij-healthgeographics.com/content/8/1/46
Page 7 of 8
(page number not for citation purposes)
researchers in choosing and applying the right solution(s)
in each case.
Kamel Boulos (unpublished research notes, 2008–2009)
proposed the development of a case-based reasoning soft-
ware framework (cf. case law) that covers, and continu-
ously "learns from", the growing body of possible and
emerging health research scenarios and applications
involving precise geographical identifiers about individu-
als. The goal of such a 'one stop shop' framework would
be to streamline the provision of clear and individualised
guidance for the design and approval of new research
projects, including crisp recommendations on which spe-
cific privacy-preserving solution(s) and approach(es)
would be suitable in each case. This would spare research-
ers and IRBs the need to 'reinvent the wheel' with each
new study, saving them precious time and efforts spent
investigating the same issues every time, and preventing
avoidable errors and omissions along the way. This deci-
sion framework should ideally have an easy-to-use, wiz-
ard-based visual frontend, guiding users throughout the
whole process of describing and diagnosing their needs,
and proposing (with appropriate explanations/justifica-
tions) suitable solutions to address them.
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